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SYNONYMY WITHOUT ANALYTICITY
ROGER WERTHEIMER
If it's true by definition that a judgment is analytic if
it's true by definition, there would seem scant space for
skepticism that there are analytic judgments. Despite this, such
skepticism is now common and commonly the cause is epistemic. One
main complaint is that all evidence of analyticity is entrapped in
assumptional circles. What beliefs are expressed and evidenced by
a speaker's utterances depends on the speaker's linguistic rules;
and vice-versa: whatever a speaker's verbal and nonverbal
behavior, it could evidence and be explained by any of many sets
of linguistic rules, depending on the speaker's substantive,
synthetic, extralinguistic beliefs.  So no identification of a
speaker's semantic rules and analytic truths is better evidenced
than countless competing interpretations of the linguistic data.
Hence, allegedly, all hope of detecting analyticity is naive
delusion.
However, for various more or less familiar reasons, this is
the wrong way to get at what's wrong with the concept of
analyticity. For starters, congenital evidentiary
underdetermination is a dubious cause for skepticism. Evidence of
anything is essentially underdetermined. Appearances of anything
can be deceiving -- and must be: they wouldn't be appearances if
they couldn't deceive, be explained by and justify competing
interpretations. (What is properly called "evidence" for a
judgment never entails the judgment, except via a premise that is
not itself a bit of evidence.) All evidence lies in one
assumptional loop or another. The circles surrounding linguistic
data are distinctive in content, but not in epistemic structure. 
Besides, whatever the evidentiary deficiency, it may sanction
only doubts about justifications of ascriptions of analyticity --
without questioning the reality of analyticity. Epistemic
skepticism about our evidence of analyticity entails no semantic
or ontic skepticism about the intelligibility of the concept of
analyticity or the reality of the property and instances. A doubt
whether we can know some fact (or justify a belief or predication)
isn't itself a (ground for) doubt whether a determinate fact is
there to be known -- not unless some verifiability principle is
assumed. Such principles are infamously suspect, especially if
analyticity is a suspect concept.
Epistemic worries won't imperil the coherence of the concept
of analyticity. But neither is coherence vouchsafed by the
consensus on instances: which judgments are hot prospects for
analyticity, which are not serious candidates, and which are
problematic examples. This point -- and much else about
analyticity --  may be obscured by the endemic delusion that, at
least for the speaker herself, synonymy and analyticity are
inseparable from knowledge of them. The naturalness of this
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picture is evident in the confidence with which a Michael Dummett
can say: "It is an undeniable feature of the notion of meaning --
obscure as that notion is -- that meaning is transparent in the
sense that, if someone attaches a meaning to each of two words, he
must know whether these meanings are the same."i 
But in light of recent research, what should now be
undeniable is that people commonly and confidently think they
sense synonomy or ambiguity when their intuitions are far better
described and explained by factors other than word meaning
affecting our reading of an utterance.ii  For example, despite the
naturalness of intuiting that "right" and "true" are synonyms in
contexts like "What she said is true/right", in fact those
predicates operate on syntactically (logically/metaphysically)
contrasting subjects.iii The competence to speak a language
properly and even sensitively neither requires nor provides
anything more than fallible intuitions of synonymy. 
The seeming "transparency" of synonymy is sheer illusion.
Linguistic meanings and sameness of meaning are not simple mental
perceptibles; a correct definition is essentially a theoretical
claim, the best explanation of complex patterns of linguistic
behavior. This is so even for words of no special philosophical
interest. With the terms at the center of philosophical topics,
the whole history of the subject since Socrates teaches us (if it
teaches anything at all) that if there is anything that we don't
really know, it's the analysis and definition of our conceptually
central terms.iv  
The native speakers' sense of the linguistic propriety of an
utterance is authoritative since that sense is first-order and
constitutive of the language. But our claims of semantic and
syntactic rules are second-order, metalinguistic, and not
definitive of the language; they aren't authoritative except as
approximations, rough guides to facilitate ordinary commuication.
(For daily purposes, it does no harm and sometimes does help to
tell someone that "right" and "true" are contextual synonyms.)
Neither the (alleged) necessity of analytic truths nor their
(alleged) knowablity a priori suggests that we apprehend them
infallibly or with anything close to the automatic, absolute,
precise certainty we have with a sharp pain or a bright color, or
even a simple personal intention.v  
Another trouble with the epistemic critique of analyticity is
that the attack on the concept of analyticity -- an artifice of
modern philosophy -- is essentially equally an attack on the
elemental idea of synonymy (sameness of meaning) and thus of our
pretheoretical idea of meaning.  This adds to the interest and
excitement of the critique, but this spicier skepticism offends
commonsense, rendering the critique a reductio.vi  
The concept of analyticity is a creation of philosophical
theory. Even our name for it goes back but 200 years to Kant, and
while the concept is explicitly operative a century or so prior in
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Hume and Leibniz, traces of any earlier appearances are hard to
find. However natural the notion may now seem and however readily
it may be acquired, philosophical innocents need to be introduced
to the idea. If the notion proves of little use, that might
surprise and sadden us, yet its loss is felt only by philosophers;
the rest of the world can well whirl on without it. 
In contrast, while laymen's understanding of sameness of
meaning may be inchoate, with paradoxes infecting the folk lore of
synonymy, we can't even begin to theorize about language without
some conception of interpretation, translation, sameness of
meaning (synonymy) and difference of meaning (e.g., ambiguity.)
We can't formulate the axioms of logic ("p v -p", "-(p.-p)")
without the idea that the negated "p" has the same meaning as the
affirmed "p." We can't formulate self-identity statements as
Iu: U=U (or "u=u" read indifferently as: Uncles are uncles,
An
              uncle is an uncle, [The property of] Unclehood is
[the property of] unclehood, The class of uncles is
              the class of uncles.)
without the idea that the left flanking term has the same meaning
as the right one. Natural language synonymies might be as rare and
fleeting as summer snow, but denials of the possibility of
synonymy, like Eleatic denials of the possibility of motion, seem
less intelligible than the object of the denial.
Skepticism about the concept of analyticity has more direct
and compelling motivations, free of verificationist and other
suspect epistemic assumptions, and free of general doubts about
linguistic meaning and synonymy. Consider:
Au: An uncle is a parent's brother.
     Nu: The symbol "uncle" has the same meaning as the symbol
          "parent's brother." 
Take Au to be a statement of a paradigm analytic truth (if there
be anything of the kind), and take Nu to be a statement of a
paradigm correlate semantic norm (if there be anything of the
kind.)
The concept of analyticity now in question is specifiable by
its implicit claim, the Analyticity Thesis (A-Thesis): If an N-
statement like Nu is true, then a correlate A-statement like Au is
true, necessarily and just because the N-statement is true. 
The A-Thesis is an explanatory claim with the form of a
conditional: If Nu is true, then, just in consequence, Au is true
necessarily. That conditional doesn't assume the fulfillment of
the antecedent or its detectability, so the thesis may bed with
worries about justifying claims of analyticity. The A-Thesis is a
claim about the explanatory import of synonymy, not about the
existence of synonymy or the evidence of it. 
This may be obscured by the diversity of definitions of
analyticity in the literature. Some characterize analytic
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judgments in explicitly explanatory terms: e.g., "true by
definition," "true in virtue of the meanings of the terms." But
many characterizations seem simply descriptive, not explicitly
explanatory: e.g., "the denial is a self-contradiction," "the
predicate concept is contained in the subject concept". With a
descriptive characterization like "the result of substituting
synonyms in a logical truth", the mere existence of synonyms
entails the existence of analytic propositions (albeit perhaps
unuttered.) No matter, for then a variant of the A-thesis must be
waiting in the wings, for the one fixed point about analyticity is
that philosophers have cared about the concept only because of its
promise of providing an explanation of necessary truth and a
priori knowledge.vii 
Whether, characterized one way, the analyticity of some
judgments is unarguable or whether, characterized another way,
what is intuitive is only the necessity of certain truths, in any
case the essential question is whether the truth of some judgments
is explainable solely by certain internal properties of the
judgments that render their truth autonomous. Friends of
analyticity may differ on which truths are necessary or on which
necessities are explained by analyticity, but the friends would
abandon analyticity if it explained no necessities. 
And it better explain truths of some importance: analyticity
can hold no more philosophical interest than what it explains.
Yet,
necessarily, no controversial claim is consensually judged
analytic. Apart from the preposterous -- albeit seemingly
attractive -- example of mathematics, where are the statements
that are both of serious philosophical interest and
uncontroversial examples of analyticity? 
The residual truth of Quniean skepticism is that the
epistemological problems besetting analyticity claims deprive the
concept of epistemological utility: no science is furthered by the
idea. Once freed of the illusion that synonymy is phenomonological
or precisely sensed infallibly, analyticity finds no epistemic
function in justifying any statement. Even if all mathematics is
analytic and we knew it, we'd need the same old techniques for
determining which mathematical claims and conjectures are true,
false, undecidable or ill-formed. And so too for any alleged
philosophical or nonphilosophical analytic judgments rooted in
common speech. Indeed, even a properly modest epistemic skepticism
about claims of analyticity suffices to  undermine the utility of
the concept: if there were a genuine, sharp analytic-synthetic
distinction, verifying its application would require substantial
synthetic, extralinguistic assumptions. 
The epistemic skepticism exposes the poverty of the concept.
But its incoherence isn't understood unless we see why the A-
Thesis explanation is bogus -- even for a triviality like Au.viii
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 An N-statement states an identity of meaning between two
expressions. It may be read as predicating a semantic property of
an expression; Uncle" is a symbol having the same meaning as the
symbol "parent's brother". Sentence Nu can be said and read as a
sheer stipulation or as some quasi-imperative, neither true nor
false. But taking it to be (expressing) a true report of an
operative linguistic rule facilitates mapping Nu's truth
functional relations with Au. So read, Nu states a contingent fact
about the expression "uncle." Nu predicates of that symbol the
property of having the same meaning as the other expression,
"parent's brother."ix
That is also a legitimate reading of Au. A-sentences can be
and commonly enough are said and read as an alternative way of
expressing an N-statement. But that's not the only interpretation
of an A-utterance, nor the most natural. In its standard, default
reading, Au is predicating a property (being a parent's brother)
of a subject, an uncle or uncles, perhaps actual normal uncles or
every possible uncle, or it may predicate the identity of the
property with the attribute of unclehood or the essence of uncles.
Whatever, Au has the grammatical form of a substantive, synthetic
predication about extrasymbolic reality, just like:
Suf: An uncle is a boy's best friend.
Sub: An uncle is a bore.x
Any sentence with Au's grammatical form can be said and read
either "predicationally" as a substantive predication about
extralinguistic reality or "notationally" as declaring
(stipulating or reporting) a correlate N-statement about the
meaning of the subject term (and/or the predicate term.)xi If a
notational reading is more unnatural with Suf and Sub than with Au,
that's only because, given our understanding of standard English,
we find Nu intuitively plausible while the correlative Nuf and Nub
are just incredible. Still, Suf and Sub could be said as Nuf and
Nub, as meaningful, albeit blatantly false claims about prevailing
linguistic norms or as stipulations for or reports of an
alternative notation. This predicational/notational ambiguity is
syntactic, not morphemic or dependent on peculiarities of
English.xii
The ambiguity in Suf and Sub is for us a dead option, but with
Au the ambiguity is all too alive. The A-Thesis owes much of its
plausiblity and semblance of coherence to the ease with which we
bounce blindly back and forth between the two readings. The irony
of analyticity is that the idea has invited dismissal of diverse
claims as being either substantive but false or true but trivial,
yet that dilemma is the plight of the A-thesis itself, except that
the second option is truisms mixed with mistakes.
The now standard interpretation of the A-Thesis is that the
transition from Nu to Au is mediated by the merest truth of logic,
the Law of Identity. That law is instantiated by Iu and Ip:
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Iu: An uncle is an uncle. 
Ip: A parent's brother is a parent's brother.  
Nu licenses substitutions in both Iu and Ip, yielding both Au and
Ap: A parent's brother is an uncle.
This looks like simplicity itself and it plainly precludes a
notational reading of Au. If Au is a necessary truth it can't be
equivalent to the thoroughly contingent Nu. The semantics differs
since the syntax differs. Consider: 
NDj: Nu: "Uncle" and "parent's brother" are synonyms.
Ju: Joe is an uncle.  
Jp: Joe is a parent's brother. 
SDj: Sub: An uncle is a bore. 
Ju:  Joe is an uncle.  
Jb:  Joe is a bore.
ADj: Au: An uncle is a parent's brother
Ju: Joe is an uncle.  
Jp: Joe is a parent's brother.
SD is a formal deduction licensed a principle of inference, a rule
of logic. Formally, ND is not a deduction or inference but simply
a substitution licensed by a notational convention. What of ADj?
The syntax and truth conditions of predicational and notational
readings differ as those of using and mentioning a word differ.xiii
Reading Au notationally makes ADj structurally like NDj. ADj is
formally akin to SDj if and only if Au is predicational. 
Analyticity is a vacuous concept and the A-Thesis a
degenerate explanatory claim if the explanans (the truth of Nu) is
the explanandum (the truth of Au). If analytic truths are vacuous
(void of extrasymbolic information) then analyticity is a vacuous
concept and the A-Thesis a vacuous explanation. For the A-Thesis
to have real substance, the truth of Au must categorially differ
from the truth of Nu yet somehow be a consequence of it. 
Put it this way. If the A-Thesis is to be a genuine
explanatory claim about language, truth or meaning, it can't
itself be an analytic truth. Otherwise, by its own lights it would
tell us only about symbols like "language," "truth," "meaning,"
and nothing extranotational about their referents. Unless Au is
only a notational varinat of Nu, no notational convention
connecting "uncle" and "parent's brother" will secure the truth of
"Nu explains why Au is true" -- not without a further rule
relating the sentence Nu with the predicate "explains why Au is
true." The A-Thesis can't be both interesting and true by
definition, if it's true by definition that analytic judgments are
true by definition.
If you mean to assert Au predicationally and explain its
truth via the A-Thesis, you may be suffering any of various
confusions. For one thing, an N-statement may serve to identify
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the proposition expressed by an A-sentence, so the N-statement may
partly explain what statement is made by substitution of a
synonym. But that's not the same as explaining why the statement
is true, or whether it is true. It is not incorrect to say that Nu
partly explains why "Joe is an uncle" (Ju) is true, but it is
likely to mislead. Nu helps explain why (in virtue of what) Ju
states that Joe is an uncle, and thus -- if in fact Joe is an
uncle -- why Ju states a truth (= is true.) However, Nu does
nothing to explain why (it's true/a fact that) Joe is an uncle (if
fact it be.) The fact of Joe's being an uncle is independent of
and unexplained by linguistic truths like Nu. So too, while Nu may
explain the truth of Au in the way it explains the truth of Ju,
the A-Thesis is of interest only if Nu explains why (it's a fact
that) an uncle is a parent's brother, and not just why Au states
that fact.
According to the A-Thesis, that fact is explained by Nu's
licensing substitution into a logical truth. The assumption here
is that substitution of synonyms perforce preserves a sentence's
syntactic and semantic properties: more specifically, that
substitution of a synonym into the expression of a logical truth
transfers the necessity of that truth to the resultant expression.
That compositional principle might have an initial intuitive
obviousness, it might seem axiomatic, hardly worth a second
thought, yet it is false. 
Ju ("Joe is an uncle") may say the same as Jp ("Joe is a
parent's brother"). Iu ("An uncle is an uncle") may say the same
as IuG ("Ein Oheim ist ein Oheim"). But Iu plainly does not say
the same as Au ("An uncle is a parent's brother"), read either
predicationally or notationally. For starters, Iu may be read as
"An uncle is self-identical/itself"; Au cannot. Au may be read as
a definition, Nu; Iu cannot. If Iu has a megtalinguistic reading,
it is not a defintion like Nu. "U=U" (Iu) can't be synonymous with
"U=P" (Au). They don't share the same logical form.xiv Iu is a
truth of logic; Au is not. Just what is asserted with Iu and
whether it's some substantive extrasymbolic fact may be
controversial, but it's certainly not the same as the standard
reading of Au. Just what is logical form and how any proposition
could be true in virtue of logical form may be problematic, but
certainly Au (predicational or notational) is not true just in
virtue of its logical form.
Analytic A-sentences like Au have the very same syntax as
synthetic S-sentences like Su. Their only difference is purely
semantic: there are N-sentence licensed substitutions into A-
sentences that yield the expression of a logical truth. But, note,
any and every S-sentence yields the expression of a logical truth
via some set of N-statements. It's not some peculiar
syntactical/formal feature of A-sentences that enables them to be
transformed into formal, logical truths. A-sentences are simply S-
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sentences, whose requisite N-statements happpen to be true (of a
particular language at a particular time and place.)
But expressions of self-identity like Iu are peculiar. The
Law of Identity is thought to be a basic law of logic, axiomatic,
conceptually elemental, an atomic thought, simple and
unanalyzable. So Fregean puzzles about identity statements
commonly are presented as problems about alter-identity
statements, as though the semantics, epistemics, and metaphysics
of self-identity statements were (sufficiently) clear and
unproblematic. (Just as the mind-body problem gets discussed as
though the concept of mind is problematic, the concept of body is
not.) Yet, however primitive "U=U" may be in some axiomatic
system, it's not cognitively or conceptually primitive. As
children (and as a species) we don't and presumably could not)
first understand the concept of self-identity and statements of
self-identity, and then master "U=P" on the model of "U=U". We do
-- and must -- first understand statements of the form "U is
(identical with/the same thing as) P", before we can make sense of
"U is U".xv
 This may suggest that "U=U" is a degenerate or limiting case of
"U=P", but that description of the relation dangerously
deemphasizes crucial differences.
Statements of the form "u=u" have no pretheoretical use in
our lives. "u=p" can be understood as an answer to "What
(which/who) is u?" (or "What is p?"). If "u=u" can at all be
regarded as a genuine answer to such a question -- as identifying
u --  such useage is hardly automatic or unproblematic, since it
doesn't epistemically identify the u.
 When we say things like "War is war" or "Charley is Charley"
we don't standardly mean "War is identical with war" or "Charley
is one and the same thing as Charley" or "Charley is self-
identical". Roughly, we may be referring de re with the subject
term and de dicto with the predicate term. We are saying of the
object referred to with the subject term that it has its
stereotypical properties: i.e., properties which, in this world,
are inevitable features of the thing, but which need not be
metaphysically essential features of the thing.
"U=U" is standardly read as "U is identical with U". While
this says the same as "U is self-identical", the latter is less
misleading. The former looks like a special case of "U = [1]"/"U
is identical with [1]xvi, as though the property possessed by U is
the very same as the property predicated of P in "P=U" (or "U=P"),
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namely the property of being identical with U. Yet this suggests
that, as regards U, the property of being identical with U is
(identical with) the property of being self-identical, whereas, as
regards P, the property of being identical with U is not the
property of being self-identical.  
The A-Thesis' explanation of Au's (alleged) necessity
presumes that synonymy switches preserve logical form. That
(alleged) necessary truth of Au can't  derive from the contingent
synonymy presented by Nu; at best Au's necessity might be
transferred, by means of the substitition rule, from the necessity
of a logical truth. But the truth of "U=U" is necessitated by its
form. (Logic as the structure of truth.) Aside from its form there
is no necessity in Iu, indeed no reason at all to attribute truth
to it.  Unlike "U=P", there is no fact (other than the fact of the
symbolic form) that could make "U=U" be true. (What is the fact of
your being you? Is being identical with yourself one of your
properties; is that different from your being self-identical?
Everyone is self-identical, but only you are identical with you;
no one else has the property of being you.  
To deny the A-Thesis is not to deny that, for example,
sometimes it's proper and useful to avow one's allegience, for the
nonce, to a synonymy and to settle a dispute by declaring it
purely verbal. You can, and sometimes have good reason make Au be
true by meaning and reading Au notationally, and making Nu be true
(of your idiolect, for the nonce) by committing yourself to Nu as
a rule. When your speech is guided by the rule, Nu (= notational
Au) is true of your idiolect, but you can't make Nu or
predicational Au be a necessary truth.   
At best, synonymies necessarily transmit truth. The synonymies
themselves are contingent. At best it's contingent that a sentence
expresses an A-statement: it needn't have been that "Unlces are
parent's bothers) states a necessary truth.
Intuitively, if synonmy can tranmit the lgical necessity  it
does, and must do so. If it could do it at all, how could it ever
fail to? But it can't, because there isn't any necessity, any
truth to transmit other than the form, and it's precisely the
formal symmetry that the symbol switch destroys. It presupposes
and preserves syntactic form. (Synonyms needn't share the same
syntactic categories, but unless they do they can't form A-
sentences; they can't transform truth's of logic. Truth's of logic
aren't true simply in virtue of their syntactic form. a=b and a=a
have the same syntactic. But they don't have the same symbolic
form.
It's the symbolic content, not just it's syntactic structure. I
don't mean the semantic content of the symbol, but the physical
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content: the fact that the same physical symbolic element appears
here and there in this syntactic form
What of: Tomorrow today will be yesterday.
The surface syntactic form does not look like any logical
form
 (x)(if x is Tomorrow, and y is Yesterday, and z is Today
(x) (y) (z) (Fx.Yy.Tz) > x is the day after z, and z is the
after y> x is the day after y
The person known as Cicero is the person known as Tully. 
It's not the meaning of "or" and "and" but the nature of
propositional disjunction and conjunction
It may help here to consider the contrast identities of sense with
identities of reference. 
1. Uncles are uncles (Iu)
2. Uncles are parental brothers (Au)
3. Abe Lincoln is Abe Lincoln
4. Abe Linclon is Abraham Lincoln
5. The author ofthe GA is the author of the GA 
6. Abe Linclon is the author of the Gettysburg Address
 
1 ,3 & 5 are statements of self-identity, instantiations of the
logical truth: (x)(x=x). true necessarily, due to logical form.
Their truth is logically necessary since it is due to their
logical form.
2, 4, 6, are statements of alter-identity, they are not truths of
logic; their logical form is: a=b
1,3,5 are logically necessary; 2,4,6 are not
2 is an analytic identity, an identity of sense; it represents the
relation of defining property: b (parent's brother) is the
defining property of a (uncle). 4 & 6 are synthetic identities,
referential identities. 
4 & 6 might be thought to be necessary truths due to much the same
confusion that might make 2 seem to be a necessary truth. As with
2, we may confuse predicational and notational readings. Grant
that proper names are "rigid designators" and that definite
descriptions can be. Still, "abe" and "abraham" are arbitrary
symbols; what they name needn't have been named by either term or
by any name at all. Whether an object is so named is contingent.
So the referential truth here is 
NRa: The object named "Abe" is also named "Abraham".
4 "Abe is Abraham" will be a contingent truth when 4 is read
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notationally, as a way of saying NRa.  
Given the contingent truth NRa, then 
Saying that it's true due to its logical form may mislead.
The explanatory "due to" ("because of", "in virtue of") can't here
signify quite the same relation as with contingent truths. A
necessary truth is , after all, a proposition whose truth is not
contingent upon, dependent on some independent truth. Logical form
can't explain a proposition's truth in the way that a fact may be
the material, efficient cause of another fact, another truth.
Generally the fact that S explains the truth of "S"; it seems
right to say that the propositional, symbolic entity is true
because of the reality of the fact. But with the logical truth
it's unclear whether there is any fact expressed that is somehow
prior to or in any way distinct from the truth expressed, the
essential character of the proposition.
The way that logical form might illuminate truth may be
misconceived. As a matter of psychological fact, though we may
sometimes insist that logical form is something more abstract than
a physical shape, we're bound to be influenced by the power of our
mode of visualizing a truth. We tend to blithely dismiss the
physical, sense-perceptible features of our symbols as
"arbitrary", of no logical, semantic or syntactic importance. Here
we're thinking of the equivalence of the phonetically different
terms and words of different languages. But, peculiarly in the
realm of logic, concerns about the physical forms and
configuration of symbols. Like a poet whose concerns with sound of
her words is of a piece with her concerns with their sense, a
logician's interest in the layout of symbols in visual space is
driven by his interest in the content of the expression. There is
more than one interest here. Some notations provide or facilitate
processes of computation. Here our concern is with perspicuous
representation: what is the best picture of what is portrayed,
expressed. There is indeed a great naturalness in our symbol of
equality and identity: "=". Somehow our symbol "a=a" seems to
capture and convey the essence of identity. It's a picture
consisting of the same label appearing and then repeated, each
time symbolizing the same thing. Contrast "a=a" with "a is self
identical". Presumably the latter says the very same thing as the
former, but it's visual meaning is nil. It's natural to think that
"a=a" shows something of what it says or that it says something
about what it shows, that it says or shows something about
flanking the symbol "=" with the same symbol. Symbols like "Iuu",
"a is a" "a is the same as a" or "a is identical with a" may be
comparable but are far less effective, compelling visualizations.
"=" portrays what it means, while "is identical with" and "I" do
not. In any case, the iteration of the referring expression
presents a picture of the identity relation as here a relation
between an expression and its iteration. The visual display is
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sequential yet synchronic: it reads from left to right, yet
permits reading back right to left, for the ordering around the
sign is essentially irrelevant, and unlike a audial signal, the
whole symbol is present all at once, like what it symbolizes. 
All this is lost, nothing like it is suggesed by "a is self
identical" or "a is identical with itself." We don't so readily
sense the sense of saying: The proposition, "a is self identical"
is true due to its form. That sentence provides no picture of a
form. But for that reason, the refelexive expressions block the
picture of the predicate here being the same independent of the
subject. With "=a" or "is a" or "is the same as/identical with a",
it looks like the predicate is to be read as portraying the same
property or relation independent of the subject term. But, my
being identical with RW is not a matter of logical form, whereas
my being self identical is.      
One might here wonder why Au is not synonymous with Iu, and
why Iu is any more a logical truth and/or any less true by
definition than Au, for it seems that, just as Au requires Nu, the
sentence Iu expresses a logical truth only because of the
contingently true NIu:
NIu: The word "uncle" in subject position has the same
meaning
          as the word "uncle" in predicate position. 
Consider also Nta:
Nta: The word "tomatoa" (pronounced with a long "a") has the
         same meaning as the word "tomatoa" (with a short "a").
If "A tomatoa is a tomatoa" is to be read as It ("t=t") and not as
Ata ("ta=ta"), then why can't Au be read as Iu?  After all, just as
Au may be read predicationally or notationally (= Nu), Iu, It and
Ata can (in principle) be read predicationally or notationally, as
ways of stating, respectively, NIu and Nta.
However, while the latter have the appearance of N-
statements, their resemblance with Nu is mere masquerade. Nu is a
semantic rule. NIu is best considered a syntactic rule. While Nu
is an arbitrary independent convention governing a specific pair
of expressions, the NIu is actually an instance of a general rule,
NI, regarding the symbolic constancy of tokens of a symbol type.
NI is more a rule about "=" or "is" and only incidentally about
any specific word flanking those symbols; it is not a definition
of any flanking symbol. 
On the other hand Nta is best considered a phonetic rule that
the alternate pronounciations are only phonetic variants of a
single word. Such rules regarding phonetic variants are
indispensible, for without them we could not (e.g.) represent self
identity with "u=u" since no two physical tokens of the same type
are qualitatively absolutely identical. But "parent's brother"
can't be a phonetic variant of "uncle" if its meaning is
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constructed from the meanings of independent morphemes: "parent,"
"brother," "'s". 
Perhaps it is possible in principle for (e.g.) "lawyer" to be
a mere phonetic variant of "attorney" in some English-like
language. Then Aa ("An attorney is a lawyer") would be strictly
synonymous with Ia ("An attorney is an attorney.") But then Aa
would itself be a logical truth, merely a phonetic variant of Ia.
And then Aa couldn't be analytic, since Ia can't be. If
analyticity is truth by definition, truths of logic aren't
analytic, for their truth is due solely to their syntatic form and
not to the semantics of their terms.xvii To suppose that the
propositions of logic owe their truth to arbitrary notational
conventions is to confuse the proposition represented by a
notational structure with the notational rules for representing
the proposition.xviii If "synthetic" means "nonanalytic"  (=df "not
true by definition"), logical truths are synthetic. This may
depart from traditional useage of "analytic," but that predicate
becomes superfluous if it's coextensive with "logical."xix
Syntax threatens the A-Thesis in another way. The A-Thesis
assumes that N-statements plus logic suffice to yield truths. But
consider: 
Nf: The symbol "farnchoap" has the same meaning as the
           symbol "nurple."
     Af: A farnchoap is a nurple. 
I might say Nf while explaining a code I've been creating. Nf may
be true, yet it can't entail or explain the truth of Af if only
because it doesn't even entail that Af is grammatical and
meaningful. If Nf states the only existing rule governing
"farnchoap" and "nurple," then these symbols may be
intersubstitutable but their grammar is indeterminate. Are they
nouns? particles? prepositions? Is Af grammatically ill-formed
like (*Ap) *"A precedes is an is before"? Such questions don't yet
have answers, known or unknown. Nonetheless, while Af needn't be
true or meaningful, it's true that "farnchoap" and "nurple" mean
the same in my Nf code, just as it's true (enough) that "precedes"
and "is before" mean the same.xx
No truth could be explained solely by definitions, since what
statement, if any, a sentence expresses depends essentially on its
syntax and logical form, not on word meaning alone. The A-Thesis
can at best be only that if an N-statement is true, then some
correlative A-statement is true, and true solely due to the
meaning of the A-sentence.xxi 
As an aside, let's note that the A-Thesis doesn't require the
expressions mentioned in N-statements to be terms representing
concepts. The expressions can belong to any grammatical category.
Consider pairs like "precedes"-"is before", "also"-"too",
"if"-"when", and A-sentence forms like "X precedes Y just in case
X is before Y," "Either X saw Y too or X did not see Y also," "If
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p then q, if it's true that when p then q." Such A-sentences
aren't standardly cited to illustrate analyticity, and perhaps are
not recognized as candidates. Yet, like every A-statement, these
are generated by same rule: Take a sentence expressing (an
instantiation of) a logical truth in which a symbol occurs twice,
and replace one occurrence of the symbol with a surrogate licensed
by an N-statement. A-statements are formed by and only by
notational substitution into expressions of logical truths.xxii
Our friends "farnchoap" and "nurple" shed light on another
aspect of the A-Thesis. N-statements state semantic rules,
definitions. They regulate the range of sounds and scripts within
which we're saying the same thing, but they do so without
identifying or referring to what we and our words say and mean. In
this respect N-statements resemble phonetic rules. (Recall the
comparison of Nu with phonetic rules for "tomato".) The flip side
of this is that the rule generating A-sentences is subject to
qualification or nullification by arbitrary phonetic conventions:
e.g., no A-sentence is formed by the N-statement of "a" and "an"'s
synonymy since phonetic rules preclude substitution. 
The generation of A-sentences may be constrained by diverse
symbol specific rules, like those restricting replacement of
"parent's brother" in "Dutch uncle." More generally, unlike
phonetic variants, each natural language synonym has a body of its
own and so it can and normally does take on a life of its own as
it acquires its own associations, connotations, metaphors and
ironies. (Try "spouse's female progenitor" in the typical mother-
in-law joke and listen for the lack of laughs.) Vagueness,
indeterminacies, and matters of degree surround the boundaries
between (one of) a word's strict literal sense and its other
distinct senses, and its possible metaphors and connotations. One
clear lesson of Wittgestein's reminders on rule following is that
when synonyms start to diverge (a place where one word fits while
the other feels inapt), the question of which -- if either word --
has changed its sense need not have any answer, known or unknown.
(That such questions never have a knowable answer is a radical,
resistable inference.) 
An N-statement can't itself tell us how to take specific
tokens of a sentence type. It can't itself determine which
utterances are A-sentences (derivable by substitution of a synonym
in a logical truth) since (1) the rule is inevitably riddled with
licensed exceptions, (2) the rule and its exemption rules are
inescapably subject to indeterminacies, (3) on any given occasion
the speaker may be deviating from the rules.
Again, the problem here is not that we can never know which
tokens are A-sentences, for generally we need only ask the speaker
how she means her words. Of course, she may well be unreliable
regarding a past intention, since we don't generally think about
or have firm and definite linguistic commitments while speaking.
And even with our immediate present intentions, we aren't
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absolutely omniscient and infallible, for we don't and couldn't
really have much idea what we would say if faced with every
hitherto unimagined circumstance. Still, these epistemic
limitations are endemic to all intentions and aren't peculiar to
linguistic intentions. The varying degrees of uncertainty
afflicting the data pose no more threat to the A-thesis than the
inevitable presence of comparable uncertainties imperils other
explanatory hypotheses. 
Instead the trouble is that the speaker can't make her
utterance conform to an N-statement except by her present
intention, but she can't maintain the A-statement predicationally
while constraining herself by a commitment to the N-statement. Her
commitment to the synonymy commits her to speaking notationally
when insisting on the necessity of the A-statement's truth. She
can speak predicationally only if (as is normal) her speech
conforms to the rule but without a commitment that overrides all
motivations for deviations and revisions in response to
information.
Look at all this anew in the light of "farnchoap" and
"nurple." My Nf code reminds us that an N-statement doesn't itself
identify the meaning of either mentioned symbol, for it doesn't
identify the meaning that both symbols have, what both of them
mean.  Nu might be said to state (present, identify) that meaning,
but only because its definiens happens to have a meaning we're
familiar with, while Nf does not. Yet formally Nu and Nf are on a
par (as are Au and Af): assertions of this form don't assert the
meaningfulness of the definiens or the definiendum.
Nf doesn't identify the meaning that both have expressions
have, for it doesn't imply that there is any such meaning. We
might balk at Nf for that very reason, for our N-statement formula
-- ""X" has the same meaning as "Y"" -- may seem to imply that the
mentioned symbols do have a meaning, just as "X has the same size
(shape, color, etc.) as Y" implies that X and Y have a size
(shape, color, etc.) But, first, however natural and proper that
inference may normally be, it remains sensible and true to say
things like "Monday has the same size (shape, color) as Tuesday,
namely none at all." In this sense, prior my Nf code "nurple" and
"farnchoap" had the same sense: viz, no sense. What's unclear is
what it comes to for me to stipulate that these expressions have
the same sense, whatever the sense they acquire.   
Whatever oddness infects Nf, it falls away as "nourple" and
"farnchoap" gain enough sense for Af to be as meaningful and true
as Au. By seeing what must be added to attain this, we 
Moreover, even if "X has the same M as Y" did imply that both X
and Y have an M, surely no such implication attaches to "X has
neither more nor less M than Y" or "X has no different M than Y".
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We can formulate an A-Thesis using the latter formula.
We can formulate various A-Theses with various conceptions of
definition represented by various formulae for definitions. We
can, explicitly or implicitly, build into the A-Thesis a
requirement that the symbols mentioned in the N-statement and used
in the A-statement have meaning. We may insist that, as used in
the expression "true by definition," a definition must have a
definiens that has meaning, that is meaningful and not merely
interchangeble with the definiendum without an alteration of
sense. We may enforce this by reformulating N-statements
disquotationally as, e.g.:
Nud: The word "uncle" means parent's brother.
And then we may regard
Nfd: The symbol "farnchoap" means nurple.
as ill-formed or ungrammatical or not (fully) meaningful or not
truly a sentence. We may say that it expresses no statement, no
propositional truth or falsehood.
But after saying all this, has any progess been made?
Presumably, Nud is equivalent to Nu: the term "parent's brother"
is truly predicated of a thing if and only the thing is a parent's
brother. Nud brings us no closer to an explanation of the truth of
Au.
question remains whether this new A-Thesis makes good sense or
whether it only covers over the difficulties in the A-Thesis we've
been looking at. 
 
Or we may say that Nfd is an instance of or has the same
general function as:
Nfx: The symbol "farnchoap" means whatchimacallit. 
 or: The symbol "farnchoap" means X.
      or: The symbol "farnchoap" means ... . (pronounced as "dot
           -dot-dot."
Such formulae do in fact function as English sentences in ordinary
talk about talk. Like other N-sentences they may be used to enact
a notational rule, stipulating a definition. Here Nyx:
Nyx: The symbol "Y" means X.
may be used as a way of saying !Nyx:
!Nyx: Let the symbol "Y" mean X.
But unlike !Nyx, expressions with the form of Nyx are indicative
declarative English sentences that can express true statements
reporting the operation of a notational rule. For example,
occasionally we don't know or don't care to use the standard word
for something, so we employ a symbol that serves as a phonetic
variable but not necessarily a semantic variable. The rule in this
case is that the capital of "x" represents but doesn't specify
what is meant.
Logicians may, for their own purposes, restrict the use of their
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symbols for (so-called) open sentences and stipulate that such
symbols can't themselves be asserted or express true statements.
But it's a bit of narrow-minded linguistic legislation, not a
plausible piece of descriptive linguistics, to say that natural
languages like English don't have standard readings of such
formulae as expressions of true statements.
 It's not linguistically deviant for Nfd to be used equivalently
with Nf, a fully grammatical means of stating a semantic form,
without attributing a semantic content. Nfd differs from Nyx
because the latter presents only a phonetic form, whereas Nfd is
more naturally used to present a specific phonetic content. So  Af
may be used as way of saying Nf or Nfd, just as Au may be used to
express Nu or Nud. But like Af, Nfd cannot (yet) say anything more
than Nf, whereas Au and Nud can say more than Nu. In this regard,
the point of defining "analytic," "A-Thesis," "N-statement" 
This won't salvage the A-Thesis since it will emerge that Nuq
says nothing apart from our fallible synthetic beliefs about
brothers of parents. What "parent's brother" there refers to and
what it means can't be fixed by any stipulation or convention
without substantive synthetic beliefs about what the term is
predicable of and what is predicable of its referent(s).   
This point will emerge more clearly by starting with a bare
notion of definition as stating only notational
intersubstitutabity, and then exposing step by step what is needed
to get Af to be as meaningful and true as Au. 
A definition can't teach us the meaning of the definiendum
unless we already know the meaning of the definiens. That
epistemic platitude is a corollary of the semantic axiom that
unless the definiens already has a meaning it can't endow the
definiendum with any. A notational convention can't capture or
create the semantic content of its symbols, since it presupposes
and does not explain the significance of the definiens.
This is obvious with verbal definitions such a N-statement. It's
not so obvious, but no less true (as Wittgenstein taught us) of
explanations of meaning by ostension, exemplification, etc. Such
definitions cannot communicate the meaning of the definiendum
unless the audience shares the speakers intended focus of
attention,  and manner of perceiving and conceiving the object of
attention. The definer's verbal and nonverbal behavior can't
constitute a meaningful definens apart from her extrasymbolic
beliefs about the object, and about the speech context of defining
as well.  
Thus, given only Nf, if Af is grammatical enough to say anything
it can say no more than Nf, a thoroughly contingent truth. By
contrast, Au can say more than Nu, due, not to Nu's truth, but to
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further truths about Nu's mentioned symbols. (So too, as things
are, if (Nun) ""Nurple" means the same as "uncle"" is true, then
(Aun) "A nurple is an uncle" can say more than Nun.)
Let's supplement my Nf code by selecting a grammatical
category for the mentioned symbols: e.g., count noun. This
specifies the semantic form of the symbols, but does not provide a
determinate content; it secures the grammaticality of Af ("A
farnchoap is a nurple") but not its meaning. Neither symbol has a
semantic content fitting it for use - other than display - in
substantive speech. Af still says hardly more than Nf. In uttering
Af, we aren't predicating some property, nurpleness, for no
property is specified by this symbol; nor do we refer to some
subject, a farnchoap, for no subject is specifed by that symbol.
We don't yet get a true instance of the Law Identity in "A
farchoap is a farnchoap" (If), for If isn't truly meaningful -
except when read as: "Whatever if anything "farnchoap" may
signify, if it's a term, a farnchoap is a farnchoap."  So If may
be either an equivalent of Nf or some metalinguistic equivalent of
the Law of Identity, but it's not yet a substantive instance of
the Law of Identity like Iu.
Even given the laws of logic and the grammaticality of Af, Nf
doesn't yield an Af asserting some substantive predication.
The semantic vacuity of the Nf symbols isn't much altered by
assigning them a general semantic category: e.g., name of an
(unspecified) biological species. Af can still say little more
than Nf, for the symbols lack determinate reference. Substantive
predications with either symbol lack determinate truth conditions.
Do farnchoaps fly? Or photosynthesize? Are some nurples purple? Is
one in my soup or under your bed? Or are they extinct? To such
questions the answer remains: that part of the code has yet to be
decided. The symbols haven't been endowed with semantic substance,
but only a form for it.
Af becomes like Au only when it says something determinate,
true or false, about extrasymbolic reality, and thus only when Sf
sentences have determinate truth conditions like Su sentences.
What we're talking about, what we're saying about it, the truth
conditions and whether they are fulfilled must have a determinate
reality.
They needn't be "perfectly determinate," whatever that might
mean. Even the best entrenched terms suffer sorts of vagueness and
other indeterminacies of application. But with genuine terms like
"uncle," uncertainties of application exist only when and because
there are reasons favoring the application (e.g., similarity to a
paradigm) and reasons against it. "Nurple" still hasn't sense
enough to be genuinely vague. As the name of a still unspecified
species, the indeterminacy is near total: there are no reasons for
or against any predication of the term. None except that it
doesn't apply to inanimate things. But that's no reason to apply
the term to one species rather than another, for there is no truth
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or even approximate truth to one application or another. This
indeterminacy occasions no uncertainty. Epistemic problems of
predication can't arise before reference becomes determinate
(enough.)
"Nurple"'s reference must be fixed, but can't be without
substantive, synthetic assumptions about extrasymbolic reality. No
definiens can fix reference until its own relation to the real is
fixed by extrasymbolic beliefs. Symbols and symbol systems can't
mean or refer to anything without their speakers regulating their
usage with extrasymbolic judgments. A notational system may be
mechanically operated without beliefs, but its output represents
truth-valued statements only via an interpretation embedded in a
system of extrasymbolic beliefs. Apart from substantive beliefs, a
system of rules (conventional or otherwise) is not a language, and
a sequence of symbols says nothing true or false.
This demand for determinate application is semantic, not
epistemic.xxiii Our beliefs can fix reference without being
knowledge or even true. Taken singly they may be false and
revisable without altering a term's meaning. We may disagree over
some of them while sharing the same lexicon; we must be able to
since a notation isn't a propositional language if speakers can't
disagree over the expressible propositions. Big differences in
reference fixing beliefs may permit or enforce different readings
of a term, but that's not because those beliefs (or their denials)
entail some statement of the term's meaning or the truth
conditions of its predication. The reference fixing beliefs aren't
entailments of a term's predication.
Determinate application is not secured by conventions and an
isolated reference fixing belief alone, but rather by their
linking the symbol to a whole propositional language and thus
placing it within the ambit of a whole system of beliefs and the
norms of rational thought the system is subject to. A belief - and
thus a concept and term - exists and operates only within a
network of beliefs; its content is defined by its functioning in
an inferential system. An believer can't have just one belief,
with no other beliefs conditioning it or consequent upon it, for
the belief is nothing apart from its mutual conditioning and
conditioning by other beliefs, and the system's mutual
conditioning and conditioning by extracredal reality.
A credal system and its concepts are normatively structured.
A complex of attitudes and dispositions can't constitute genuine
beliefs, and a notational system can't be a language without
(sufficiently) conforming to norms of rational thought. The more
scrambled the "speech," the more arational the "thinking," the
less content to the "beliefs" and "terms," and the more the
agent's behavior is explained by impulses, drives, and
nonintentionalistic events.xxiv
A symbol is a significant term only when its application is
subject to - regulated, evaluable, and revisable by - principles
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of rational coherence with the rest of a speaker's beliefs.
Ultimately a term's meaning is a matter of what is a
(satisfactorily or optimally) reasonable way of contouring and
organizing a speaker's speech as a whole.xxv Shaping our speech
(inner and outer) means shaping the expression of thought, both
the thoughts expressed and the expressive symbols.
What our words do mean (what our concepts do contain) is an
essentially normative question; its answer depends on what our
words should mean (what our concepts should contain) given our
present predicational proclivities and the realities of the world
we speak in and of.xxvi As with a legal system and other norms we
create, de facto definitional rules can be invalid. The
interpretation enforced in current practice may be erroneous,
illegitimate and subsequent reasoning may justify declaring that
what we'd "known" to be law has all along been void ab initio, not
a law de jure. That possibility is permanently open, though it may
often be effectively unimaginable.
When Kant introduced the term "analytic judgment," baptizing
a conception he found in Hume and others, it wasn't true by
definition that an analytic judgment is true by definition. Hume
and Kant believed that certain judgments were true just in virtue
of the conceptual content of the judgment. Post-Kantians
translated this talk into a linguistic mode precisely because they
thought their reformulation wasn't strictly equivalent to the
original but instead provided a more adequate explanation of the
truth of those judgments. Which definition of analyticity is
correct or the best is a substantive issue of logical theory that
isn't settled by citing a stipulation and a tradition of adherence
to it. However hoary the tradition, the acceptance of a definition
doesn't certify its correctness, for it may fail to capture the
intended intuitive idea or the idea may be irredeemably inchoate.
While the modern semantic conception of analyticity may be
unfaithful to the original conception(s) of Leibniz, Hume, and
Kant, the older ideas may be woolier but no wiser. Suppose (ala
Frege) concepts are objective, with properties (e.g. containment
of another concept) independent of our cognition. Then the puzzles
about necessity and a prioricity get reframed as puzzles about
concepts rather than first-order objects, but how does that help
toward to a solution: Must this concept contain that concept? Why?
How do we know? How do we know our ideas of the concept are
correct? If instead concepts are subjective, with properties
dependent on our cognition, then how do they differ from
linguistic meanings in any way that advances the answers to the
metaphysical and epistemological questions?
 
Ultimately the craziness in the concept of analyticity is the
idea that some judgments are autonomous, that their truth is
somehow internal to an isolated thought and independent of all
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other truths and thoughts, so that nothing could be a reason for
revising the judgment. But the content of a judgment can't be
autonomous and neither can its truth. The positivist project of
securing such autonomy by stipulating arbitrary notational
conventions for logically perfect languages is to no avail. Purely
arbitrary rules don't persist in natural languages; their
interpretation, retention and revision are subject to evaluation
and regulation by the rest of our rules, beliefs and interests --
which is why instances of "perfectly" synonymous symbol pairs are
rare in real languages.xxvii
The alethic autonomy of analytic judgments is a mirage, a
myth, and much like the alleged autonomy of moral judgments from
"factual" judgments and metaethical judgments. But that's another
story.xxviii
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.Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978) p.   . This is a
persistent theme of Dummett's: e.g., "... if someone understands two
expressions that have the same meaning, he must know that their
meaning is the same" ("What Does the Appeal to Use Do to the Theory of
Meaning?," in A. Margalit, ed, Meaning and Use (Dordrect:Reidel, 1979)
130.) Dummett is hardly idiosyncratic here: e.g., "Any proposition I
can apprehend is a proposition that is fully known to me, in the
relevant sense, for the only relevant sense in which one may be
"acquainted with" a proposition is that one may fully apprehend it"
(Nathan Salmon, Frege's Puzzle (Cambridge, MA, 1986) p. 107.)
ii
.See my The Significance of Sense (Ithaca: Cornell) 1972, esp.
Chapter II, Jay Atlas, Philosophy Without Ambiguity (Oxford University
Press, New York) 1988, and work cited therein.
iii
.As explained in my forthcoming "Truth, Fact, and Rightness
Reconceived", our alethic "true" is a predicate of "that S"
complements, not of "for NP to VP" complements, whereas "right" is a
predicate of "for-to" complements, not of "that S". That syntactical
contrast pulls the plug on the preference for rightness over truth
expressed by Goodman, Elgin and Putnam.
iv
.See my "Socratic Skepticism,' in Metaphilosophy, Oct., 1993.
v
.Semantic "insight" into word and sentence synonymies and ambiguities
must be comparable to mathematical insight -- otherwise the
analyticity of mathematics could never have been a remotely plausible
thesis. For computational prodigies, a massive multiplication may be
as transparent as two digit addition is for most adults; other
prodigies of discovery see deep theorems and elegant skeletal proofs
with a sense of immediacy and self-evidence. Yet, we're all liable to
make even simple mathematical mistakes. The purest light of human
reason is still the product of a causal cognitive mechanism of a
finite, fallible creature, subject to the world's contingencies, prone
to mistakes and great pockets of ignorance. The sheer necessity of a
truth doesn't necessitate our detecting it or accepting it upon
detection or rejecting all imposters. We might stipulate that perfect
rationality requires necessarily believing a priori necessary truths,
but that's likely not the most useful conception of perfect
rationality. (Compare: must an ideal perceptual mechanism be immune to
all illusions and hallucinations? Or aren't they sometimes precisely
what we should see if our perceptual mechanism is operating as it
should?) The logical properties of a cognitive object needn't
correspond with its cognitional properties. Synonymy is a transitive
relation; the  obviousness of it is not: each link in a chain may be
obvious while the relation of the first to the last link is not.
vi
.It also seems fishy to question the intelligibilty or reality of
synonymy with arguments relying on the circle of intentionality and
the evidentiary interdependence between substantive beliefs and
semantic rules. The familiar critiques don't look like reductios, yet
they argue from this interdependence to deny its presupposition: viz.,
the intelligibility and reality of semantic rules.
vii
.It's been argued that some necessary truths are knowable a
posteriori and not (or not only) a priori, or that some contingent
truths are knowable a priori. However, to my knowledge, it is
universally accepted that an analytic truth must be both necessary and
knowable a priori. Here the focus will be mainly on the metaphysical
issue of necessity rather than the epistemological issue of a priori
knowledge, because the latter is, I believe, derivative and ill-
defined. Consider: suppose some facts are knowable simply by knowing
what a statement of them says; still, what's the point of calling
knowledge of the fact a priori when the knowledge/understanding of
what a statement of them says requires substantial a posteriori
knowledge?
viii
.Contrast this with the analysis in Hilary Putnam's classic "The
Analytic and the Synthetic," in ..................... wherein Putnam
grants the existence of only trivial "single-criterion" analytic
truths.
.Nu may instead be read as being about the phrase "parent's brother" and Au may be read
as being about a parent's brother. Alternatively, Nu could be read as being about the pair
of phrases. Nothing here turns on whether the topic of discourse is given by the subject
term or the predicate term. (Cf. Atlas, Philosophy Without Ambiguity.)
Also, as pertains to analyticity, we can regard "An uncle is a parent's brother" as
having the same grammatical form as "Uncles are parent's brothers."
.If the N-statement's mentioned symbols name a linguistic type, its correlate A-statement
will, in one sense, be stating facts only about a language, not something extralinguistic.
No matter. Even with, e.g., (Ad) "A dictionary is a compendium of definitions" read
predicationally the reference of the terms of Ad is not to its own symbols, as it is in the
correlate Nd. In that respect any A-statement is about extrasymbolic reality.
Also, this predicational/notational contrast cuts across that between the so called
"is" of predication and the "is" of identity. Au might be read as "u=p" where u is the
class of uncles or the attribute, unclehood and p is the class of parents' brothers or the
attribute, parents' brother. Any such reading differs from both "(x)(x is the meaning of
"uncle" = x is the meaning of "parent's brother")" and "the meaning of "uncle" = the
meaning of "parent's brother"."
.In this and other respects, the predicational/notational ambiguity is comparable to
other "factual"/"normative" ambiguities: e.g., "The initial letter of a written English
sentence is capitalized" may (be used to) state a rule or report an observable regularity.
xiii
.The syntactic category of an enquoting, mentioning symbol is that of a count noun,
whatever be the syntax of the symbol enquoted. The symbol enquoted may also be a count
noun; it could well be itself an enquoting symbol; but that has no bearing on the structure
of the use-mention relation.
.I've discovered that Hilary Putnam long ago noted this point of logical form
("Synonymity and the Analysis of Belief Sentences," in Analysis 14 (1954), 114-22.)
However, Putnam does not press it as a threat to the concept of analyticity.
.Here too, we could just as well focus on "[1] = U"/"[1] is identical with U". 
xvii
.The confusions surrounding the A-Thesis surround the idea that "-(p and -p)", "(p and
q) > p", etc. are true in virtue of the meaning "and", and "p or -p)", "p > (p or q)" etc.
are true in virtue of the meaning of "or". Sentences expressing logical truths can be read
notationally, as expressing linguistic truths about the particles, operators, etc. But the
substantive logical truth require a predicational reading of the sentence.
xviii
.Logical truths can't be explained by notational conventions, because they are
presupposed by and regulate notational conventions: e.g., the Law of Identity requires that
a predicational notation permit interpredication of coreferential symbols.
The same confusion between explaining (identifying) what proposition is expressed by a
sentence and explaining why the proposition is true
idea that (e.g.) "p and q" implies "p" and  "p" implies "p or q") is true in virtue of the
meaning of, respectively, "and" and "or"  
.These points are reinforced by the need for refinements of the general rule generating
A-statements. Notational substitution of one occurrence of a symbol occurring twice or more
in a logical truth needn't yield what we'd call an analytic truth, unless each occurrence
is nonredundant, essential to the truth of the whole statement. Consider:
I:  Ju (Joe is an uncle) or not-Ju or Ju.
II: Ju or not-Ju or Jp (Joe is a parent's brother.)
Like I, II is a truth of logic, and not analytic, for its truth is independent of the truth
of Nu or other N-statements.
Note also that only substitution of equivalent symbols is licensed by N-statements
alone. To get from Nu to "An uncle is a brother" we need an inferential principle: (x)(x is
a T1's T2 > x is a T2). Additional instructive refinements on generating A-statements are
discussed in fn. 14 below.
.A comparable problem haunts the move from (NuG) "The (English) word "uncle" has the same
meaning as the (German) word "Oheim"" to (AuG) "An uncle is an Oheim." We might charitably
let AuG pass as a legitimate, fully intelligible English sentence. More problematic is AuC,
the inscription formed from Iu by replacing the predicate "uncle" with the semantically
equivalent Chinese ideograph. Yet the correlative NuC is quite unproblematic.
.The Kantian image of analyticity as the "containment" of the predicate concept in the
subject concept may be apt. Its translation into later linguistic conceptions of
analyticity in terms of terms, definitions, semantic rules, etc. is problematic. The
problem of that translation is at the heart of the whole problem of radical translation. I
take it that for Kant terms are not names of abstract individuals (a property or set)
comparable to the proper name of a concrete individual. A Kantian term represents -
expresses and is controlled by - a concept, and Kantian concepts are not semantic rules,
and most certainly not notational conventions. A Kantian concept is a complex, not of
names, but of predicates, or, better, of predications, judgments, thoughts expressed by a
whole sentence or net of sentences. However, Kant seems to suffer the Cartesian illusion
that our concepts are transparent to us, that we can directly, infallibly intuit their
contents.
xxii
.Kant is regularly criticized for (sometimes) arbitrarily limiting analyticity to simple
subject-predicate judgments. One might better complain that he, like his descendants,
limits analyticity to a relation between terms, symbols representing concepts. But we might
instead worry whether either complaint is a fair criticism and whether Kant's conception of
analyticity as concept containment is captured by the modern linguistic versions.
xxiii
.We have no evidence of someone's accepting a synonymy claim like Nu apart from evidence
of her extrasymbolic beliefs. To make sense of her verbal behavior we must make sense of it
within some shared conception of extrasymbolic reality. She can't express her synonymy
beliefs unless she has some, and she can't have synonymy beliefs about genuine terms
without substantive conceptions of the referents. 
xxiv
.Once more, the point is not epistemic, but logico-semantic. We can't identify what
someone's words mean without our using a normative interpretational grid, because their
meanings have no identity, no existence apart from the compliance of her speech with
rational norms.
.Here we may lump together with the "meaning" of a term its intension, the entailments of
its predications, the essential contents of its concept, etc.
xxvi
.Again the epistemic relations are derivative. We can identify someone's beliefs and
semantic rules only by making sense of those beliefs and norms, and we do that only by
seeing their fit with our own norms of sensible speech. We need to do that because the
identity of these objects (beliefs, meanings, rules) is normatively structured.
xxvii
.In an artificial language wherein Nf is fixed by fiat, Af may say more than Nf, but not
more than If ("A farnchoap is a farnchoap.") But in living languages terms take on lives of
their own, for fiats can't hold them fast, so Au says more than Iu ("An uncle is an
uncle.") In natural languages the purest cases of synonymy are marginal examples, like the
derivative symbol pairs generated by contraction rules: e.g., "brother of parent"-"parent's
brother"; "it is raining"-"it's raining"; "is not"-"isn't".
xxviii
.My thanks for needed help from Bredo Johnsen and Al Spangler.
